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Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms: A
Practical Approach to Thoroughbred

Breeding Syndications and Securities
Laws*
In 1949, a group of horsemen led by Bull Hancock of Claiborne Farm purchased a fiery Irish colt named Nasrullahfor

a record $340,000. With so many partners involved, Bull decided to divide the horse into thirty-four shares at $10,000 a

share. Bull's theory was that each share would entitle the
holder to breed one mare a year to Nasrullah. Twenty-four
years later, Seth Hancock, Bull's son, would syndicate a large
chestnut grandson of Nasrullah named Secretariat. Secretariat

had not yet won the Triple Crown when Seth completed the
thirty-two share syndication for a then staggering $6.08 million.'

INTRODUCTION

As the syndication of Shareef Dancer for $40 million in 1983
shows, 2 syndication values have increased dramatically since the

1975 syndication of Secretariat. 3 Accordingly, syndication agree-

* The primary issue of Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms is the application of Federal
Securities Laws to a specific set of uniformly drafted thoroughbred breeding syndicate
agreements. An analysis of the court's holding on this issue has required that additional
syndicate agreements be referenced and compared. Syndicate agreements, being contracts
between private parties, are not a matter of public record unless previously litigated.
The agreements referenced in this Comment were obtained through the kind cooperation
of individuals involved in the various syndications and were chosen as being representative of syndicate agreements as a whole. Where helpful, provisions have been excerpted.
See generally STEvEvCRIST, THE HoRsE TRADERS 47-83 (1986).
2 Shareef Dancer was syndicated into 40 fractional interests each costing $1
million. Record Review, 1983 THOROUGHBRED REc. 4693.
3 For the purposes of this Comment, the terms "syndication" and "syndicate"
are used in the context of thoroughbred breeding syndicates and syndications. See
generally text accompanying notes 19-32 infra.
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ments have also become very complex.4 The thoroughbred industry, however, prefers that these complexities not include
compliance with federal and state securities laws.- Although the
prevalent view among commentators has been that the securities
laws are not applicable to the typical breeding syndication, 6 no
federal court had ruled on the issue until the recent case of
7
Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms.
Kefalas involved the sale of fractional interests in three thoroughbred stallion syndicates to the plaintiffs, John Kefalas and
Kevin Grevey.8 The defendants, Bonnie Brae Farms and Ronald
Rosen, in their capacity as syndicate managers and acting through
their agent, Robert Fowler, offered to sell the plaintiffs'

4 The Nashua Syndicate Agreement, dated December 15, 1955, contains 11 provisions relating primarily to the division of ownership and the management of the
stallion. See J. HUwpnREys, RACING LAW 346-48 (1963) (provides Nashua Syndicate
Agreement). Current syndication agreements contain upwards of 30 provisions and
include provisions covering limitation of warranties, application of federal and state law,
and non-partnership taxation. See, e.g., Liloy Syndicate Agreement; Seattle Slew Syndicate Agreement; Lydian Syndicate Agreement.
When a particular transaction involves the sale of a "security," the transaction
becomes subject to federal and state (blue sky) securities laws. Considerable time and
costs are involved in registering the transaction with the federal and state securities
commissions. Even if the transaction should qualify for an exemption from registration,
the exemption process itself is time consuming and increases the expense and complexity
of a transaction. In addition, the substantial remedies afforded plaintiffs under federal
and state securities laws increase the potential costs of a transaction should a lawsuit
prove successful. For these reasons, the stallion syndicator will attempt to avoid having
the syndication fall within the scope of the federal and state securities laws. See Campbell, Stallion Syndicates as Securities, 70 Ky. L.J. 1131, 1133-34 (1981-82).
6 See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1158; Kegley, Watching for Securities, 1984
BLOOD HORSE, 6122, 6123; Comment, Equine Syndications: Are They Securities?, 6 N.
KY. L. REv. 361, 377 (1970).
630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985). There have been two state blue sky cases,
however, dealing with racing syndicates and interests. See Brown v. Rairigh, 363 So. 2d
590 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978) (No "common enterprise" was present when the plaintiff
purchased a 10% interest in a racehorse that remained under the complete control of
the original owner.); Marshall v. Harris, 555 P.2d 756, 761 (Or. 1976) (A racing syndicate
is a security under Oregon's blue sky laws.); Campbell, Racing Syndicates as Securities,
74 Ky. L.J. 691, 695 (1985-86).
1 See Kefaas Complaint & Grevey Complaint, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms,
630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
The facts set out in the Kefalas opinion are limited. The sale involved fractional
interests in the Laomedonte, Lydian, and Rio Carmelo syndicates. For a more extensive
summary, see Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for
Summary Judgment, Kefaas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
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nominations9 to other breeders as necessary. 10 The plaintiffs
alleged that this representation was fraudulent and "had converted the fractional interests into securities regulated by various
[Kentucky] and federal statutes. . . ,,n Judge Wilhoit, for the
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky, granted
summary judgment for the defendants, holding that the syndication agreements did not constitute "securities" under federal
2
or state law.'
The court specifically addressed the applicability of the Securities Act of 193313 and the Securities Exchange Act of 193414
(hereinafter Federal Securities Acts) to breeding syndicate agreements." The applicability of the Federal Securities Acts to the
individual agreements between the plaintiffs and defendants and
the notion that these individually negotiated agreements could
constitute securities, 16 however, was rejected only implicitly by
the grant of summary judgment. 7 This Comment examines Ke8
falas and the court's application of the Federal Securities Acts
For a definition of "nomination," see text accompanying notes 20-22 infra.
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss and for Summary
Judgment, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
" 630 F. Supp. at 7. The plaintiffs also alleged a RICO violation in the sale of
the fractional interests. Id. at 7. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants
on the RICO claim because the plaintiff's RICO claim rested on a finding that the
fractional interests constituted securities. Id. at 9. The plaintiffs had relied on the part
of 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) which defined racketeering activity as "any offense connected
with ... fraud in the sale of securities." Id.
Id. at 8.
15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-bbbb (1986).
14 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-kk (1986).
1 630 F. Supp. at 8.
'0

16 See id.
17 FED. R. CIv. P. 56(c) provides that summary judgment "shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law."
(emphasis added).
The grant of summary judgment against the plaintiffs, as it related to the issue of
individually negotiated agreements, was not addressed in the court's opinion. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 630 F. Supp. 6.
" The Kentucky Securities Laws are not addressed in this Comment. As the Kefalas
court noted, the definition of a security under Kentucky law is "substantially the same"
as the federal definition. 630 F. Supp. at 9 (citing Scholarship Counselors, Inc. v.
Waddle, 507 S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1974)). The court also noted that Scholarship "....
adopted the method of analysis used in Howey [see text accompanying notes 33-38 infra]
for determining when an instrument is a security." 630 F. Supp. at 9.
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to breeding syndicates and individually negotiated agreements.
I.
A.

TiE BREEDING SYNDICATE AND THE SECURITIES LAWS

Breeding Syndicates in General

Breeding syndicates are designed to provide breeders with
access to a valuable stallion when sole ownership is cost-prohibitive. 19 The syndicate usually consists of thirty-two to forty fractional interests. 20 Generally, a fractional interest entitles the owner
to breed one mare to the stallion each year. 2' This annual right

is commonly known as a "season" or "nomination" and can
be sold for any particular year. 22 General supervision and man-

agement
of the stallion is the syndicate manager's responsibility. 23 Additionally, the syndicate manager is responsible for
administrative duties such as record keeping and selection of
11Examples of the syndication value of some of the more expensive stallions:
Conquistador Cielo, $36 million (Conquistador Cielo Syndication Agreement); Spectacular Bid, $221million (Spectacular Bid Syndicate Agreement); Seattle Slew, $12 million
(Seattle Slew Security Agreement); Erins Isle, $8 million (Erins Isle Syndicate Agreement);
Secretariat, $5.32 million (Secretariat Syndication Agreement). See generally Kegley,
supra note 6, at 6122.
2 Examples of fractional interests a syndicate is commonly divided into: Nijinsky
II, 32 fractional interests (Nijinsky Syndicate Agreement); Danzig, 36 fractional interests
(Danzig Syndicate Agreement); Seattle Slew, 40 fractional interests (Seattle Slew Syndicate Agreement).
A fractional interest is sometimes referred to as a "share," but this characterization
may increase the possibility that the interest will be classified as a security. See Campbell,
supra note 5, at 1132 n.4 (citing United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837,
850-51 (1975)).
21 "The owner of each ...
Fractional Interest shall be entitled to one (1) free
breeding nomination to the Stallion in each breeding season in which the Stallion stands
at stud." Erins Isle Syndicate Agreement, art. I, § 1.1. See also Affirmed Syndicate
Agreement, art. V, § 5.1; The Sharpen Up Syndicate Agreement, 9(a); Lydian Syndicate
Agreement, 9.3; Shareef Dancer (USA) Syndicate Agreement,
10.
S"[T]he Breeding Right Holder may sell or transfer away a single breeding
nomination in each year as it becomes available." Silver Buck Syndicate Agreement,
art. I, § 1.2. See also Cox's Ridge Syndicate Agreement, 1 6; Danzig Syndicate Agreement, 5; Slew O'Gold Syndicate Agreement, art. V, § 5.2; note 32 infra.
2
"The Syndicate Manager shall have all reasonable authority and discretion with
respect to the keeping, maintenance, care, management, breeding and supervision of
Pancho Villa.. ." Pancho Villa Syndicate Agreement, I 5(a). See also Monteverdi
Syndicate Agreement,
4; Spectacular Bid Syndicate Agreement, q 5; Gregorian Syndicate (U.S.) Agreement, 3; note 32 infra.
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attorneys and accountants. 24 Compensation to the syndicate
manager for these services is usually in the form of four (4)
breeding rights per year. 2
The absence of federal case law on the securities implications
of breeding syndicates has made the Securities and Exchange
Commission's (hereinafter SEC) interpretation of these syndicates critically important.26 The SEC uniformly has taken the
position, through no-action letters, 27 that a fractional interest in
a breeding syndicate is not a security. 28 A syndication agreement,
however, may contain provisions that result in a refusal by the
SEC to issue a no-action letter. 29 The more controversial provisions allow for the selling of syndicate member's nominations
by the syndicate manager ° and the pooling of revenue from

11"The Syndicate Manager shall have all reasonable authority and discretion with
respect to ... all bookkeeping and legal matters pertaining to the Syndicate and to the
subject matters of this Agreement, including without limitation . .. the selection of
attorneys and accountants as well as the compensation to be paid such attorneys and
accountants for services rendered in furtherance of the objectives of the Syndicate."
Wolf Power Syndicate Agreement,
9.2(a). See also Liloy Syndicate Agreement, art.
IV, § 4.2; Dance Bid Syndicate Agreement, art. IV, § 4.2(a); Lyphard Syndicate Agreement, 6(a); note 32 infra.
11"As full compensation for its services in each breeding season that the Stallion
stands under the supervision and management of the Syndicate Manager, the Syndicate
Manager shall receive four (4) free nominations to the Stallion in each such breeding
season ... ." El Gran Senor Syndicate Agreement, art. II, § 1. See also Spectacular
Bid Syndicate Agreement, 5; Seattle Slew Syndicate Agreement, art. V, § 5.2; Northrop
Syndicate Agreement, art. IV, § 4.07; Argument Syndicate Agreement,
9; note 32
infra.
, See Kegley, supra note 6, at 6123; Comment, supra note 6, at 377-78. See
generally Campbell, supra note 7; Campbell, supra note 5.
27 A no-action letter is issued by the SEC in response to legal issues that arise in
a proposed securities transaction. In the context of a syndicate agreement, an attorney
will submit a "no-action" request which "will typically contain a statement of the
relevant facts, the [legal] issue presented and the attorney's opinion as to the appropriate
resolution of the issue. If the [SEC] agrees with the analysis of the attorney, it will issue
a 'no-action letter' in which it states that, based upon the facts presented, it will not
recommend any enforcement action to the Commission if the transaction proceeds."
Campbell, supra note 5, at 1132 n.5.
23 The SEC has issued more than 60 no-action letters addressing the question of
whether interests in horses are securities. See, e.g., Ralph E. Jr. and Diana Schenk, SEC
No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20, 1978); Turn of the Moon Syndication, SEC NoAction Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985). See also Campbell, supra note 7, at 698 n.23;
Campbell, supra note 5, at 1147.
See text accompanying notes 30-31 infra.
- Increasing the scope of a syndicate manager's duties raises the possibility that a
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excess nominations. 31 The utilization of these provisions, however, generally is considered a deviation from the typical agree-

ment because of their potential for affecting the non-security
32
status of a breeding syndication.

court or the SEC will view the syndicate manager's efforts as "essential." See text
accompanying notes 61-69 and 79-94 infra. Thus, any provision that requires the syndicate manager to sell an owner's nominations increases the possibility that the SEC will
conclude the syndicate agreement is a security. See, e.g., Ralph E. Jr. and Diana Schenck,
SEC No-Action Letter (available Nov. 20, 1978). See Campbell, supra note 7, at 703.
The SEC, however, has issued no-action letters in regard to provisions that permit
the syndicate manager to "assist" in the sale of owner's nominations. See Rhaladdinn
Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); Turn of the Moon
Syndication, SEC No-Action Letter (available Mar. 28, 1985); See also Campbell, supra
note 7, at 699 n.24. The following is an example of an "assist" provision:
[The] Syndicate Manager will not be responsible for selling either Fractional
Interests or nominations for holders of Fractional Interests.... In the
event the holder of a Fractional Interest wishes to sell his Fractional Interest
or nomination, he may contact the Syndicate Manager, who will immediately furnish him with the name and address of any and all persons who
have inquired as to the availability of either Fractional Interests or nominations. It will then be the responsibility of the holder of the Fractional
Interest to make such use of this list as he may desire.
Affirmed Syndicate Agreement, art. III, § 3.2(f).
1' If the stallion may be bred safely to more mares than the syndicate agreement
requires, then a drawing of lots is held among the fractional interest holders to distribute
these excess nominations. See, e.g., Erins Isle Syndicate Agreement, art. III, § 3.5;
Danzig Syndicate Agreement,
5.
The sale of these excess nominations by the syndicate manager, the pooling of the
revenue, and the subsequent distribution among the fractional interest holders causes
the breeding syndicate to be considered a security by the SEC. See Campbell, supra note
5, at 1154-58. A leading commentator on equine syndications, however, has taken the
position that a pooling provision should not necessarily convert a breeding syndication
into a security unless the fractional interest holder's expectations of profits rely on the
syndicate manager's efforts under such a provision. Campbell, The Impact of State and
Federal Securities Laws on Horse Syndications, SEINAr ON EQUINE LAWv, § 3, at 14
(1986).
12 Although breeding syndicate provisions vary, commentators have relied on the
John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter (available Aug. 18, 1977) as representative of
the provisions in a typical breeding syndication agreement. See Campbell, Securities
Traps for the Unwary, PRAcncAL EQUINE BusiNEss & LAW CONFERENCE § 7, at 12
(1986); Kegley, supra note 6, at 6123; Comment, supra note 6, at 367-68. See generally
Campbell, supra note 5. The provisions in the John R. Gaines, SEC No-Action Letter
are:
1) Shares are sold only to breeders for use in their business;
2) Each share owner will have complete dominion and title with respect to
any offspring;
3) There is no understanding in connection with the purchase for any
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B. Kefalas and the Howey-Forman Test

Because a fractional interest in a breeding syndicate is not
specifically identified as a security under the Federal Securities
Acts,33 the Kefalas court had to determine whether a breeding

pooling of income or for sharing any gain or risk of loss;
4) Any unpurchased shares will be retained by the original owner of the
stallion;
5) Maintenance costs of the stallion are paid pro rata by the syndicate
manager and the other owners in proportion to the number of nominations
each was entitled to use in a season;
6) The syndicate manager receives as compensation: (a) the right to use an
agreed upon number of nominations in each breeding season after each
owner has received his nominations; and (b) a per diem reimbursement for
boarding the stallion;
7) Excess nominations will be distributed among the share owners by lot;
8) Each owner will have an insurable interest in the stallion;
9) A share owner can sell his fractional interest, but only after extending
a right of first refusal to the other owners;
10) A share owner may sell any unused nomination to another breeder,
which need not be a share owner;
11) The stallion will stand at the syndicate manager's farm with the
syndicate manager acting as agent for the owners performing custodial
functions, but the stallion may be moved and the syndicate manager
changed upon vote of an agreed percentage of the owners;
12) The shares and related breeding rights may not be sold with any
emphasis on profit potential arising out of the efforts of others;
13) If at the end of the first breeding season the agreed fertility was not
achieved, a share owner can rescind his purchase.
Kegley, supra note 6, at 6123. For an explanation of terms used, see text accompanying
notes 19-25 supra.
1- "Security" is defined by § 2(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 as
follows:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or particpation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest
in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or
privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or
any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national
securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest
or instrument commonly known as a "security", or any certificate of
interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt
for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of
the foregoing.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1986) (emphasis added). "Security" is defined similarly in § 3(a)(10)

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL

[VOL. 75

syndicate agreement qualifies as an "investment contract.

' 34

To

be considered an investment contract, a contract must contain
the four elements set forth by the United States Supreme Court
in SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 35 and United Housing Foundation,
Inc. v. Forman.36 The Howey-Forman test requires: (1) the presence of an investment, (2) in a common venture, (3) premised
on a reasonable expectation of profits, and (4) to be derived
from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. 37 All

of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement
or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share,
investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a
security, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security,
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest
therein or based on the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option,
or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign
currency, or, in general, any instrument commonly known as "security";
or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary or interim
certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or tight to subscribe to or purchase,
any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time
of issuance not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any
renewal thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1986) (emphasis added).
Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, 630 F. Supp. 6, 8 (E.D. Ky. 1985). An investment
contract is specifically identified as a security in the Federal Securities Acts. See supra
note 33. For a definition of an "investment contract," see text accompanying notes 3538 infra.
35328 U.S. 293 (1946).
36 421 U.S. 837 (1975).
37 Id. at 852. The test as originally developed by the Howey Court consisted of
an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with profits to come from the efforts
of others. 328 U.S. at 298-99. The Forman Court, however, analyzed the profit factor
independently of the "efforts of others" element. See 421 U.S. at 853-57 (hereinafter
the Howey-Forman test).
Commentators usually separate the test into four elements. See, e.g., Bonnet, How
Common is a "Common Enterprise"?, 1974 AiZ. ST. L.J. 339; Campbell, supra note
5; Tew & Friedman, In Support of SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.: A CriticalAnalysis of the
Parameters of the Economic Relationship Between an Issuer of Securities and the
Securities Purchaser, 27 U. MIAu L. Rv. 407 (1972-73). But see, e.g., Comment,
Discretionary Trading Accounts are not Securities Absent Horizontal Commonality, 60
WAsH. U.L.Q. 675 (1982-83) (utilizing the four-part test set forth in Forman).
Courts, on the other hand, generally use a three-part test. See, e.g., Curran v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on
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of these elements must be present for an investment contract to
exist. 33
39
The Kefalas court, after examining the syndicate agreements
and considering the industry realities, held that (1) no common
venture existed, (2) no expectation of profits from the fractional
interest existed, and (3) any profits from a breeding arrangement
are derived from the subsequent efforts of the investors. 40 The
court relied on the fact that the profitable thoroughbred is the
result of many distinct processes which are primarily controlled
by the individual owner. 4 ' The court's application of the Howey-

other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473
(5th Cir. 1974). But see, e.g., Union Planters Nat'l Bank v. Commercial Credit Business
Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981) (citing the
four-part Forman test).
Odom v. SIavik, 703 F.2d 212, 214 (6th Cir. 1983).
' It is important to note that the court only examined the Lydian, Laomedonte,
and Rio Carmelo Syndicate Agreements. See 630 F. Supp. at 7. As the court stated, "
... variations in the terms of syndication agreements may compel a different result
... ." Id. In this regard, the court cited only two provisions in reaching its holding.
Paragraphs 8.1 and 8.2(0 of the Lydian Syndicate Agreement read in pertinent part:
The principle purpose for which each Member of the Syndicate owns or
acquires his interest in the Stallion is to assure him the right to breed mares
owned by him to the Stallion.
Lydian Syndicate Agreement, 8.1.
[The] Syndicate Manager will not be responsible for selling either Fractional
Interests or nomination [sic] for holders of Fractional Interests except for
the aforementioned forty (40) Fractional Interests to be sold to Purchasers.
In the event the holder of a Fractional Interest wishes to sell his Fractional
Interest or nomination, he may contact the Syndicate Manager, who will
immediately furnish him with the name and address of any and all persons
who have inquired as to the availability of either Fractional Interests or
nominations. It will then be the responsibility of the holder of the Fractional Interest to make such use of this list as he may desire.
Lydian Syndicate Agreement, 8.2(0.
Paragraph 8.2(0 and the excerpted term of paragraph 8.1 are not unique or unusual
provisions in relation to other syndicate agreements. The "principle purpose" term of
paragraph 8.1 is a standard term used in most syndicate agreements. See text accompanying note 78 infra. Paragraph 8.2(f) receives more selective use, but the SEC has
issued No-Action Letters regarding its use. See text accompanying notes 26-32 supra.
41 630 F. Supp. at 8.
41 Id. The court's analysis incorporated industry realities that are not
contained in
the syndicate agreements. See Lydian Syndicate Agreement § 9.2; Laomedonte Syndicate
Agreement § 8.2; Rio Carmelo Syndicate Agreement. It may be concluded that the court
relied on the extensive analysis of the breeding industry presented by the defendants.
See generally Defendants' Memorandum on "Securities" Counts, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae
Farms, 630 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985); Defendants' Memorandum in Support of
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Forman test was somewhat brief; however, a thorough analysis

of the test's requirements reveals that the court's reasoning is
indeed sound.
1. The Common Enterprise Element
The common enterprise element focuses on the economic
relationships between parties to an investment.42 Courts are divided on whether the focus should be on the relationship between

the investors ("horizontal commonality") 43 or on the promoterinvestor relationship ("vertical commonality").44 Horizontal
commonality requires that the fortunes of each investor in 45
a
pool of investors are tied to the success of the overall venture.
In the context of a breeding syndicate, the fortunes of the
individual fractional interest holder would have to be relative to
the success or failure of the entire syndicate. Vertical common-

ality, on the other hand, requires that the fortunes of the individual investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the

efforts and success of a third party or promoter. 46 Thus, in a
breeding syndicate, the fortunes of a fractional interest holder

Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment, Kefalas v. Bonnie Brae Farms, 630 F.
Supp. 6 (E.D. Ky. 1985).
42 The term "common
enterprise" has never been fully defined by the United
States Supreme Court. See Tew & Friedman, supra note 33, at 414-15.
43 The horizontal test is followed by the Third, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits. See,
e.g., Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir.
1982); 622 F.2d 216; Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972). See also 651 F.2d at 1183 (surveying the varying vertical
and horizontal approaches among the circuits).
4 The Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have clearly adopted the vertical commonality test. See, e.g., McCown v. Heidler, 527 F.2d 204 (10th Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974); Booth v. Peavy Co.
Commodity Serv., 430 F.2d 132 (8th Cir. 1970). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a
modified vertical commonality test which specifies that the success of the promoter in
the enterprise be directly correlated with the success of the investor. See, e.g., Brodt v.
Bache & Co., Inc., 595 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1978).
41 See 651 F.2d at 1183; 457 F.2d at 278. See also Hirk v. Agri-Research Council,
Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977) (horizontal commonality requires a sharing or
pooling of funds); L. Loss, FuNDAMENTAIS OF SEcuRITEs REGULATION 255 (1983).
46 See 497 F.2d at 521-22; SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th
Cir. 1974); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enter., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). See also 595 F.2d at 461 (vertical commonality requires
only that the investor and promoter be involved in some common venture without
requiring the involvement of other investors); See also Loss, supra note 45.
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would merely have to be tied to the syndicate manager's efforts.
Because the courts are split on this issue, 47 the Kefalas analysis
of the common enterprise element is examined in relation to
48
both horizontal and vertical commonality.
a. Horizontal Commonality
The Kefalas court, sitting in the Sixth Circuit, applied that
circuit's test for horizontal commonality. 49 The test, developed
by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Milnarik v. M-S
Commodities, Inc. 0 and later adopted by the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Union Planters National Bank v. Commercial
Credit Business Loans, Inc. ," requires the fortunes of the individual investor to be tied to the success of the venture as a
whole.12 In determining that the syndicate agreements lacked the
common enterprise element, the Kefalas court found that each
purchase of a fractional interest in a syndicate "is unitary in
nature and each will be a success or failure without regard to
the others." 5 3 The court reasoned that "the owners derive profits
from the value of the offspring-a value dependent in large part
on the quality of the mare, the work of the trainer, and the
fortunes of the foal's racing season. ' 5 4 Thus, the court concluded that "[t]he profits of the owners . .. depend on their
own efforts and good fortune in addition to the efforts of the
syndicate manager." 55

See notes 43-44 supra.
It is interesting to note that Kefalas was originally filed in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. Kefalas Complaint, Kefalas v. Bonnie
Brae Farms, No. 83-0581-A (E.D. Va. May 31, 1983). Virginia lies in the Fourth Circuit,
which leans toward the vertical commonality test. See Johns Hopkins Univ. v. Hutton,
422 F.2d 1124 (4th Cir. 1970). After being transferred to the Eastern District of
Kentucky, however, Kefalas was decided using the horizontal test of the Sixth Circuit.
4'

4'

See text accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
630 F. Supp. at 8.
457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir. 1972).
651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1183.
630 F. Supp. at 8.
'4

Id.

Id.
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At this point the court reached beyond the terms of the
syndicate agreement and considered the many processes involved
in breeding a profitable thoroughbred.5 6 The court's conclusion
that the profits or losses associated with a fractional interest are
independent of the other interests is supported by the results of
the 1986 Keeneland Summer Sales in which yearlings sired by
the stallion Nijinsky IP7 sold for widely divergent sums. 8 The
average cost of a 1984 breeding to Nijinsky II-the year the
1986 yearlings were conceived-was $450,000.-9 Not only did

breeders receive vastly different prices for their Nijinsky II offspring, but of those purchasing a nomination for the 1984 season, some suffered considerable losses.6 The fact that the
offspring of the same syndicated stallion can bring such divergent prices supports the court's finding that there was no horizontal commonality and its reasoning that the breeding of a
profitable thoroughbred involves more than just the purchase of
a fractional interest.
b.

Vertical Commonality

The definition of horizontal commonality as developed by
the Milnarik court was heavily criticized by the Fifth Circuit
6
Court of Appeals in SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp. '
The Fifth Circuit rejected the importance of the pooling requirement of horizontal commonality and held that "the critical
inquiry is confined to whether the fortuity of the investments
collectively is essentially dependent on promoter expertise." 62

56
3'

Id. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
Nijinsky II was syndicated in 1970 with 32 fractional interests being sold for

$170,000 each. See Nijinsky Syndicate Agreement. A nomination to Nijinsky II for the
1987 season was recently auctioned off for $270,000. See Matchmaker Living Legends
Seasons and Shares Sales Summary (July 20, 1986).
11 Nijinsky II's yearlings sold for $3,200,000; $1,850,000; $1,400,000; $1,200,000;
$800,000; $750,000 (twice); $575,000; $275,000; $140,000; and $125,000. Keeneland Sales
Summaries (July 21, 1986); Keeneland Sales Summaries (July 22, 1986).
111986 Stud Fee Reports, RACING UPDATES 70 (Compendium).
60 See note 58 supra. It is not possible to ascertain the losses of the fractional
interest holder with any degree of certainty because, in addition to market fluctuations,
income is relative to the stallion's life span and breeding soundness every season.
61497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
2Id.
at 522.
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This emphasis on the promoter has been criticized as effectively
subsuming the "efforts of others" element of the Howey-Forman test.63 Nevertheless, in a jurisdiction that uses vertical commonality, the scope of the syndicate manager's efforts becomes
the primary issue. 64
Vertical commonality requires that the efforts of the promoter (syndicate manager) are essential.65 Therefore, the test for
vertical commonality would not be met using the Kefalas theory
that the profits of fractional interest holders are dependent primarily on their own efforts.6 A different conclusion may be
drawn, however, where a syndicate agreement includes atypical
provisions such as the sale of an owner's nominations by the
syndicate manager or the pooling and distribution of funds from
excess nominations by the syndicate manager. 67 The inclusion of
any of these provisions conceivably could expand the syndicate
manager's role so that the fortunes of the syndicate members
would actually depend on the manager's efforts.6 8 If, however,
the syndicate manager's duties are limited to the care of the
stallion and general administrative tasks, as is typical,6 9 the
Kefalas reasoning would defeat a finding of vertical commonality.
2.

The Profits Element

The United States Supreme Court in Forman"° defined "profits" as a capital appreciation resulting from the initial investment 7'

1 This blending of the "efforts of others" element with the "profits" element
was clearly identified in Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
311 (S.D. Ohio 1979) wherein the court stated, "The test would simply require (1) the
investment of capital (2) with the expectation of profits through the efforts of others. . . ." Id. at 319. Accord Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., Inc., 528 F. Supp. 9,
16 (D. Mass. 1981); Meredith v. Conticommodity Serv., Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,701 (D.D.C. 1980).
" See Campbell, supra note 32, at 19.
€' See text accompanying note 62 supra.
See text accompanying note 41 supra.
' See Campbell, supra note 32, at 19. Cf. Campbell, supra note 5, at 1137 (The
expansion of the syndicate manager's duties under the "efforts of others" element could
result in the finding of a security.).
- See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1137. See generally Kegley, supra note 6, at
6123-24.
' See note 32 supra.
o 421 U.S. 837.
71 Id. at 852 (citing SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
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or a participation in earnings resulting from the use of the
investor's funds.72 The Court stated that "[i]n such cases the

investor is 'attracted solely by the prospects of a return' on his
investment. ' 73 The Kefalas court conceded that the value of a
fractional interest's nominations could increase with the stallion's success as a sire, but concluded that the profits depended
primarily on the value of the offspring as developed by the
74
individual owners.
Approaching the issue from another angle, the court further
held that "[t]he syndicate agreement . . . read as a whole, reflects the fact that the agreement is designed to allow the [frac-

tional interest holder] to use or consume the [fractional
interest]." ' 75 The court cited Forman for the proposition that,

when a purchaser is motivated by a desire to use or consume
the item purchased, the securities laws do not apply.7 6 This

holding by the Kefalas court is consistent with its earlier conclusion that the profits in a breeding syndicate are derived from

the efforts of the individual owner and not from the fractional
interest itself. 77 This holding also conforms to the general provisions of breeding syndicate agreements which provide that the

fractional interest is being sold for breeding purposes and/or
that the purchaser is engaged in the business of breeding thor78
oughbred horses.

71

Id. (citing Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332 (1967)).
Id. (quoting 328 U.S. at 300).

74

630 F. Supp. at 8.

72

75Id.
76 Id.
(citing 421 U.S. at 853).
1 See text accompanying notes 40-41 supra.
71 The following is representative of clauses that specify that the purchase of a
fractional interest is to be "used" for breeding purposes:
REPRESENTATIONS OF PURCHASER. As a condition of sale, any
purchaser of a Fractional Interest from an Owner or subsequent Co-owner
(hereinafter "Purchaser") acknowledges and agrees, and represents and
warrants the following ... [t]hat Purchaser is engaged in the business of
racing and breeding of thoroughbred horses and that the purchase of the
Fractional Interest is for the purpose of facilitating such endeavor...
[That] the Purchaser is acquiring the Fractional Interest with the intention
of using the Fractional Interest in the Purchaser's own breeding operation
with said Fractional Interest being purchased for Purchaser's own account
and not for the purpose of reselling, assigning or in any way redistributing
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3.

The "Efforts of Others" Element

The "efforts of others" element of the Howey-Forman test
requires that the profits be "derived from the entrepreneurial or
managerial efforts of others." ' 79 Initially, courts were uncertain
whether this element required that the profits be derived solely
from the efforts of others. 0 Subsequent court of appeals cases,
however, have softened this requirement. 81 Most often cited in
this regard is SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary,Inc. ,12 in which the
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the critical inquiry is
whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the undeniably significant ones, those essential managerial efforts which affect the failure or success of the enterprise. '"83 The
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in Union PlantersNational Bank
v. Commercial Credit,14 similarly held that administrative tasks
are not managerial or entrepreneurial within the meaning of the
Howey-Forman test.8
same.
Slew O'Gold Syndicate Agreement art. XIII, §§ a-c (emphasis added). See also Danzig
Syndicate Agreement, at 1; Erins Isle Syndicate Agreement, art. XII, § 12.5.
421 U.S. at 852.

-,

See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 365 F. Supp. 588 (N.D. Ga. 1973)
The Court of Appeals for this circuit, as well as the Supreme Court, has
repeatedly stated the 'solely' test as the standard for an investment contract. This district
court sees no freedom to coin a new, different and more expansive standard in light of
these binding higher court decisions."), rev'd, 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974); SEC v.
Glenn W. Turner Enterprises, Inc., 348 F. Supp. 766 (D. Or. 1972) ("The real sticking
point in the definition of an investment contract is the requirement that investors expect
profit solely from the efforts of others."), aff'd, 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
' For cases from the circuits using a liberal interpretation of the "sole efforts"
requirement, see 651 F.2d at 1181 ("[L]oan participation purchased by the Bank does
not constitute a security."); Noa v. Key Futures, Inc., 638 F.2d 77, 79 (9th Cir. 1980)
(held "the profits to the investor depended upon the fluctuations of the silver market,
not the managerial efforts of Key Futures"); Cameron v. Outdoor Resorts of Am., Inc.,
608 F.2d 187 (5th Cir. 1979), modified on rehearing, 611 F.2d 105 (5th Cir. 1980)
(remanded on other grounds) (sale of condominium campsites held securities); Fargo
Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 1976) (investors' duties must be
"nominal and insignificant" to constitute an investment contract); 497 F.2d 473, 483
("[T]he critical inquiry is 'whether the efforts made by those other than the investor are
the undeniably significant ones ......."(quoting 474 F.2d at 482)); Lino v. City Investing
Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973); 474 F.2d at 482.
...

F

497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).

Id. at 483 (quoting 474 F.2d at 482).
651 F.2d 1174 (6th Cir. 1981).
Id. at 1185.
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The Kefalas court, however, did not evaluate the "efforts of
others" element under this relaxed definition, but instead relied
on the Forman requirement that the profits be derived from the
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others . 6 The court reasserted its analysis of the "profits" element,8 7 and held that the
profits depended "on the skills and fortunes of the individual
owner rather than on those of the syndicate manager.'' S Although the plaintiffs claimed that their profits were to be derived
from the sale of their nominations by the syndicate manager,
the court pointed out that ". . . the Syndicate Agreements clearly
and specifically state that the syndicate manager would do no
more than furnish a list of breeders who had inquired as to the
availability of nominations." 89
Because the Kefalas court does not specifically address the
impact of the syndicate manager's duties on the "efforts of
others" element, 90 a question arises as to whether the court's
analysis would hold up under a relaxed definition of this element
as used in Koscot and Union Planters. In Union Planters,91 the
court observed that the concentration of management services in
one party does not render those services "entrepreneurial" under
Howey-Forman when "efficient administration would be impossible if management [was] decentralized among all the participants." ' 92 If the syndicate manager's duties are limited to
supervising the stallion and administrative tasks93-services that
are not conducive to distribution among as many as forty fractional interest holders-then the Kefalas holding would appear
sound even under a relaxed definition. 94

16630 F. Supp.
87 See

at 8.

text accompanying notes 74-78 supra.

11630 F. Supp. at 8.
Id. at 8 (citing the Lydian Syndicate Agreement, q 8.2(0).
90 See id.
91 651 F.2d 1174.
92 Id. at 1185.
93 See text accompanying notes 23-24 and 29-32 supra.
94 The Kefalas holding established the importance of the fractional holder's efforts
to such a degree that one commentator concluded that the syndicate manager's duties
and responsibilities might be expanded beyond those presently sanctioned by the SEC.
Campbell, supra note 7, at 706-07. See generally Note, Horse Syndicates as Securities
Under Blue Sky Laws, 74 Ky. L.J. 863 (1985-86).
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INDIVIDUALLY NEGOTIATED AGREEMENTS

An unusual yet significant aspect of the Kefalas decision was
the grant of summary judgment without a discussion of the
individually negotiated agreements between the plaintiffs and
defendants. 9 Although this aspect of the court's decision does
not appear attributable to the structure of breeding syndicates
in general, a leading commentator interpreted it as reflecting the
court's opinion that promises by the syndicate manager to sell
owner's nominations will not necessarily create securities. 96 On
a more fundamental level, however, it is possible to interpret
the summary judgment as a reaffirmation of the principle, set
forth by the United States Supreme Court in Marine Bank v.
Weaver,97 that individually negotiated agreements generally are

not securities. 9

Marine Bank involved an agreement whereby two investors
pledged a certificate of deposit to a bank to secure a loan to a
company in return for fifty percent of the company's profits
and one hundred dollars per month. 99 In holding that the agreement did not constitute an "investment contract", the Court did
not use the Howey-Forman test. 1° Instead, the Court based its
decision on the individual nature of the agreement and the fact
that it was not to be traded publicly. 1 1 Accordingly, the Court
found "that this unique agreement, negotiated one-on-one by
'0 2
the parties, is not a security.'
Marine Bank has been criticized for failing to make clear its
relationship to the Howey-Forman analysis. 03 Like Kefalas,

' See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
* See Campbell, supra note 7, at 697.
17 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
11See id. at 559-60. Cf. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc.,
622 F.2d 216, 225 (6th Cir. 1980) (individual agreement in which a common enterprise

with other parties was promised did not create a security).
- 455 U.S. at 552-53.

1 Id. at 559.
Id. at 560.
'2

Id.

See Banch, Marine Bank v. Weaver: What is a Security?, 34 MERCER L. REV.
1017 (1982-83) (analysis of the Weaver's agreement under the Howey test indicates that
it should be construed as a security); Campbell, supra note 5, at 1143. Some courts have
completely ignored Marine Bank when applying the Howey-Forman test. See Hart v.
"
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however, it can be viewed as standing for the proposition that
the securities laws are applicable only to schemes, and not when
one or two "one-on-one" representations are made. This conclusion is supported by the Marine Bank Court's position that
the securities laws were not intended as a broad remedy for all
fraud. 104 The Court observed that "the unusual instruments found
to constitute securities in prior cases involved offers to a number
of investors, not a private transaction .. ."01 The utility of
such an approach is demonstrated in Kefalas: a contrary result
would allow thirty-eight non-securities to co-exist alongside two
securities in these stallion syndicates. Therefore, the Kefalas
court's grant of summary judgment appears consistent with the
position taken in Marine Bank in regard to individually negotiated agreements.
CONCLUSION

Kefalas represents a fundamental step toward resolution of
the securities issues associated with a breeding syndicate. The
court's insight into the complexities of the thoroughbred breeding industry is evidenced by its conclusion that the profitability
of a fractional interest in a breeding syndicate is controlled by
the subsequent efforts of the individual owner.106 Likewise, the
court's refusal to define an individually negotiated agreement
between the syndicate manager and a fractional interest holder
as a security, while not clearly explained,1°7 is pragmatic in light
of the realities of the breeding syndicate. In a setting where the
interest holders may negotiate individually the sale of their in-

Pulte Homes of Mich. Corp., 735 F.2d 1001, 1004 (6th Cir. 1984) (requiring horizontal
commonality to be a security); SEC v. Professional Assoc., 731 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1984);
Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner and Smith, Inc., 682 F.2d 459 (3d Cir. 1982);
Angelastro v. Prudential Bache Sec., Inc., 575 F. Supp. 270 (D.N.J. 1983), cert. denied,
106 S. Ct. 267 (1985).
104"Moreover, we are satisfied that Congress, in enacting the securities laws, did
not intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud." 455 U.S. at 556 (citing
Great W. Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976) and Bellah v. First
Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974)).
,o1
Id. at 559.
106See text accompanying notes 53-60 supra.
107See text accompanying notes 95-105 supra.
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terests, it would be unreasonable to allow the fradulent representations of one interest holder to convert all the fractional
interests into securities.
The breeding industry currently is experiencing a decline in
terms of the prices horsemen are willing to pay for both racing
and breeding stock.108 The more speculative "seasons and shares"
market is also in decline, as it must be if stud fees are to reflect
the marketplace.0 9 Consequently, this market stabilization can
be expected to bring an influx of litigation involving the disgruntled fractional interest holder who can no longer sell seasons
or yearlings at an immediate profit. Although the Kefalas decision will not protect the imprudent syndicator or syndicate manager, it should serve to insulate the typical breeding syndicate
from spurious securities claims.
In essence, the Kefalas decision is a practical application of
the securities laws to breeding syndicates and the individually
negotiated agreements associated with them. As the United States
Supreme Court held in Tcherepnin v. Knight,"0 "[I]n searching
for the meaning and scope of the word 'security' in the Act[s],
form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis
should be on economic reality."''
Timothy Nicholas Sweeney

See Cropper, Massey & Rees, Soaring Prices Led to Problems, Louisville Courier-Journal, November 16, 1986, at 1, col. 2 (As of Nov. 5, 1986, the average price for
yearlings at North American sales was $35,903 compared with a 1985 average of
$41,311.). See also Kentucky's Mixed Market, 1986 BLOOD HoRSE 8378 (November 15,
1986).
1- See Cropper, Massey & Rees, supra note 108 at 1, col. 2 ("Stud fees have
dropped an estimated 20 percent this year and are expected to decline at least another
20 percent in 1987. The amount a stallion will bring when being syndicated and retired
to stud is also expected to drop."). See also Williams, Seasons and Shares, 1986 BLOOD
HoRsE 8380 (November 15, 1986).
389 U.S. 332 (1967).
389 U.S. at 336 (citing SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946)).

